

The Meaning of Confidence when Receiving Advice

Vincent de Gardelle (CES-PSE),

Live Nerdrum (M2 Eco-Psy),

Jean Christophe Vergnaud (CES)

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Caveat

An experiment->not theory

Judge-advisor paradigm-> private, not public aggregation of opinion

Perceptive stimuli

Analysis still in progress

Stata figures

Late frost?



Consulting colleagues or statistical aids might be an easy way to improve accuracy

Do we process advice efficiently?

Suboptimal use of advice (Meehl, 1954)

Egocentric bias (Yaniv & Kelinberger, 2000)

Reducing judge confidence increase advice use (Sieck & Arkes, 2005)

Confidence as a weight to aggregate opinions

Judges prefer highly confident Advisors (Price & Stone, 2004)

Conflict cases in dyads resulted in following the judgment of the higher confidence (Koriat, 2015)

«Literal Confidence» Hypothesis:

Confidence is used as a proxy for accuracy, for both the sender and receiver of the advice

Judge final beliefs =

Judge initial beliefs + advisor beliefs

(Bayes in log odds assuming independence)

Which day was the colder in Paris? November 29th 1968 or 2018

Judge

Advisor

2018

70% confident

1968


90% confident



1968

80% confident

Judge-Advisor paradigm: a trial



«Literal Confidence» prediction:

Overconfidence -> under use of advice

A case of conflict

Perfect calibration: judge 60% sure (and 60% accurate), advisor 70% sure (and 70% accurate) -> advice taking and 60% sure

Overconfident judge: judge 80% -> no advice taking and 60% sure
20% loss in accuracy compared to advice taking

Advisor also overconfident: 90% sure -> advice taking and 70% sure

Similar level of overconfidence between judge and advisor may improve advice taking

But...



Judge



Advisor

2018


70% confident

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~~**1968**~~

~~80% confident~~



But...



Judge



Advisor

2018

70% confident

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Egocentric bias independent of overconfidence?


Judge final beliefs =

judge initial beliefs + w(advisor beliefs)

Self perception (overconfidence) and others' perception (egocentric bias) may be correlated




Some preliminary evidence: no support for the *literal confidence hypothesis* in a cueing task

Cueing experiment



- A) **Cueing session. Cue condition:** 2 predictive cues indicating with 75% validity the nature of the forthcoming stimulus (triangle pointing to the left, triangle pointing to the right). **No cue condition:** 1 neutral cue (diamond). 512 trials. Payoff: response accuracy 0.02 euros/trial.
- B) **Confidence session.** Confidence ratings from 50% to 100%. 512 trials. Payoff: confidence accuracy (probability matching rule) 0.02 euros/trial.

Main findings



Also...

Learning advisor confidence bias may alter advice use: overconfidence are backfired (Sah et al., 2013)

Overconfidence driven by optimistic reinforcement learning (Lefebvre et al, 2017)

The two, overconfidence and asymmetric reinforcement learning on advisor may be related

Some advisors are wise!



Judge



Advisor

2018

70% confident

1968

90% confident

1968

90 % confident



Objective

Test the «Literal Confidence» predictions

- Overconfidence -> under use of advice
- Overconfidence fit improve advice taking

Correlation between overconfidence, egocentric bias and reinforcement learning

Overconfidence measures

Mean overconfidence



Mean confidence – mean Accuracy

An empiric law: probability distortion in log odds

Subj. prob = elevation + slope*obj. prob.

Zhang & Maloney, 2012

Signal detection theory



*Bayesian observer: Confidence = internal signal*sensitivity*

*Overconfident observer: Confidence = elevation + internal signal*slope*sensitivity*

Judge (real people) and advisor (automata)

Judge accuracy : 70%

Advisors differing only in reported confidence

| | Low Confidence | Medium Confidence | High Confidence |
|---|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| Real Characteristics | 62.5 | 75 | 87.5 |
| Advisor 1 mean over. = 10% slope = 2.04 elevation = -.16 | 70 | 85 | 100 |
| Advisor 2 mean over. = 0% slope = 1.83 elevation = -.87 | 50 | 75 | 100 |

Accuracy and overconfidence fit: simulation

| | Well calibrated advisor | Advisor 1 slope = 2.04 elevation = -.16 | Advisor 2 slope = 1.83 elevation = -.87 |
|---|-------------------------|---|---|
| Well calibrated judge | 79.72 % | 78.66 % | 78.91 % |
| Judge Slope = 2.04 elevation = -.16 | 78.54 % | 79.61 % | 78.74 % |
| Judge slope = 1.83 elevation = -.87 | 79.41 % | 78.88 % | 79.59 % |


Subjects' overconfidence

Mean overconfidence : $M = 12.7$ $SD = 10.2$


Slope: $M = 2.16$ $SD = 1.49$

Elevation: $M = .07$ $SD = .47$

elevation = 0




Confidence as a weight to aggregate opinions?






Overconfidence and under use of advice?

Subject choice and confidence + LCH -> prediction on advice taking

Predicted




Observed




Overconfidence fit and accuracy

Advisor 1



Advisor 2



Next

Estimate a model of asymmetric learning

Judge final beliefs_t =

judge initial beliefs_t + w_t (advisor beliefs)

w_{t+1} = w_t + λ(advisor accuracy - w_t)*


Egocentric bias: w_0 estimated by conflict/non conflict x advisor x confidence level

Asymmetric learning: λ estimated by conflict/non conflict x correct/incorrect



Estimation method

observed beliefs revision = w_t (advisor beliefs) + noise


Overconfidence and observed belief revision



Overconfidence and egocentric bias?



Overconfidence and asymmetric learning?





Thus

No success to save the «Literal Confidence» hypothesis with egocentric bias and asymmetric learning

Data suggest to view overconfidence as a communication style

reported confidence = transformed internal confidence

Distribution of observed and estimated belief revisions



Any advice?